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Abstract This paper contributes to the understanding of hybrid organizations by
refining the concept of decoupling as a strategic response to conflicting objectives
and institutional expectations (Meyer and Rowan in Am J Soc 83:340–363, 1977).
In today’s popular responsibility discourse one notes a hopeful ‘‘win–win’’ ideal that
invites attempts, by companies in particular, to realize and balance conflicting
values and to strive to fulfil both profit objectives and responsibility objectives.
Although institutional theory has long acknowledged the strategic response of
decoupling in organizational contexts, the potential of exploring and refining how
this concept may be used to analyse strategic responses in the contemporary era of
market-embedded morality has yet to be explored (Shamir in Econ Soc 37:1–19,
2008). There are good reasons to do so as the present-day discourse on the relation
between the economy and morality offers a new set of options and challenges for
legitimately responding to institutional demands. This paper draws on an explana-
tory, rich ethnographic and longitudinal case study of a Swedish fully state-owned
company operating in the post 1990s gambling market. We suggest that contem-
porary hybrid organizations positioned at the crossroads of bureaucratic and market
schemes of organizing, may find themselves in a particularly tight spot and seek
legitimacy by decoupling—not only by adopting certain legitimizing structures, but
also and increasingly with reference to market-embedded morality, a commoditiz-
ing of responsibility in their contested market setting. Based on the case findings, we
& Susanna Alexius
susanna.alexius@score.su.se
Giuseppe Grossi
giuseppe.grossi@hkr.se
1 Stockholm Centre for Organizational Research (Score), Stockholm School of Economics,
Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
2 Department of Business Administration and Work Science, Kristianstad University,
Kristianstad, Sweden
123
J Manag Gov
DOI 10.1007/s10997-017-9387-3
suggest a distinction between organization-based decoupling and market-based
decoupling and propose that market-based decoupling may be attractive to hybrid
organizations owing to it being less sensitive to scrutiny and accountability claims.
But at the same time, our findings indicate that market-based decoupling poses a
risk to hybrid organizations, as it does not offer the same degree of legitimacy with
key stakeholders/the general public as organization-based decoupling does.
Keywords Decoupling  Market-embedded morality  Hybrid organization  SOE 
Gambling market  Sweden  Svenska Spel
1 Introduction
Being positioned at the crossroads of a wide range of multiple principal
stakeholders, learning how to cope with accountability for conflicting performance
objectives and demands is a core survival issue for hybrid organizations (Ebrahim
et al. 2014). The opportunity to harvest legitimacy-enhancing elements of different
institutional logics (for example, political and market logics) may help hybrids
survive and thrive. However, this is a balancing act that also brings about much
frustration and confusion to hybrids and their stakeholders (Brunsson 1994;
Battilana and Dorado 2010). Hybrid organizations can take many different
organizational forms, including public and private partnerships incorporating
elements of state, market, and civil society (Billis 2010; Denis et al. 2015; Grossi
and Thomasson 2015; Skelcher and Smith 2015). The increasing number of such
hybrid organizations in recent decades is explained by scholars with reference to the
increasing prevalence of pluralistic and complex institutional environments (Pache
and Santos 2010; Thornton and Ocasio 2008; Bromley and Meyer 2015). Hybrid
organizations need to design and manage their business models, strategies, and
relationships to maintain their consistency in the face of the tensions between their
identities, the conflicting logics they respond to and the practices they implement
(Battilana and Lee 2014). However, how hybrid organizations select, prioritize and
integrate plural institutional logics is still a topic in need of theoretical development
(Kraatz and Block 2008).
The state-owned enterprise (SOE) is an interesting case of a hybrid organization
with a dual complex mission in the sense that it is a limited corporation fully owned
by the public, hence an organization operating on the border of the political and
market spheres with their respective conditions and institutional logics (OECD
2011; Bruton et al. 2015; Grossi et al. 2015). Being positioned at the crossroads of
the market and political spheres, the SOE is expected to generate both financial and
non-financial values (Alexius and Cisneros O¨rnberg 2015) and to satisfy the
interests of both its own customers and the interests of the government and broader
public. As noted by De Geer (2011), SOEs are typically described as resources for
governments to achieve goals in a wide selection of policy areas. Public services are
often delivered by hybrid and complex organizations within policy sectors (for
example, education, health care, utilities) where multiple state and non-state actors
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are involved in the design of policy and implementation (Arellano-Gault et al. 2013;
Newman 2001). Along with profitability, an SOE can be expected to take into
account regional, market-related, social or environmental aspects, and to safeguard
particular interests in need of protection. This opaqueness or multiplicity of public
sector goals often manifest themselves as partial confusion over organizational
goals and strategy (Vining and Weimer 2016) as hybrid organizations tend to pursue
explicit social missions through business-inspired strategies (Hockerts 2015).
Following the complexity of institutional demands, SOE boards and managers
are expected to be able to interpret and balance different values and objectives as
legitimately as possible (Ebrahim et al. 2014; Radon and Thaler 2005; Rainey and
Chun 2005; Bruton et al. 2015). The tension or confusion concerning goals imposes
a cognitive burden on boards and managers that demand reconciliation, for example,
between global and local interests (Argento et al. 2016). In some countries,
following recent OECD policy developments (Christiansen 2013; OECD
2003, 2015), governments openly encourage or even demand SOEs to act as moral
role models for other corporations when performing this balancing act. However,
this may be challenging, as in the market, legitimacy is mainly based on market
mechanisms that focus on the profit economy and not on the need economy, which
is the traditional focus of public sector organizations (Jonas 1984).
Drawing on a rich ethnographic and longitudinal case study, this article offers a
vivid empirical illustration which has enabled a refinement of the theory on strategic
responses to conflicting institutional demands (Oliver 1991). In particular, the
article offers a further refinement of the concept of decoupling (Meyer and Rowan
1977) that enables a convincing explanation and fit to the altered conditions in the
current era of market-embedded morality (Shamir 2008). The article raises
questions as to the strategies used by SOEs to handle complex missions and
demands of corporate social responsibility. To date, scholars have published only
limited research on SOEs in leading management journals. Indeed, Bruton et al.
(2015) have noted a lack of scientific studies of SOEs as hybrid organizations
conducting business activities. Only a few studies have focused on hybrid
organizations, and most of this research has had a public administration orientation
(Koppell 2003; Billis 2010; Denis et al. 2015; Skelcher and Smith 2015). While the
previous literature mainly refers to mixed public and private hybrids (Grossi and
Thomasson 2015; Vining and Weimer 2016); the case organization discussed in this
paper—Svenska Spel—is an SOE that is a hybrid by constitution as it embodies
conflicting logics related to its structure as a limited corporation fully owned by the
Swedish government. We analyse responses to this challenge by scrutinizing what
happens over time in an SOE that operates in a contested market setting (gambling)
and that is presented with a dual mission and expectations to act as a moral role
model by organizing ‘‘responsibly’’ in the market.
In recent decades, socio-moral questions previously the concern of civil society
and the political system have increasingly become ‘‘the business of market actors’’
(Shamir 2008). This development calls for a re-examination of the ways
organizations—and hybrid organizations in particular—respond to conflicting
objectives and institutional pressure. There is a lack of studies on how hybrid
organizations’ responses to conflicting objectives and demands are influenced by the
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altered conditions deriving from the increasing emphasis on market-based responses
(such as sales of ‘‘responsibility labelled’’ products and services).
In this article we address this important topic by introducing a neo-institutional
framework to strategic responses to institutional processes and by suggesting to link
this theoretical discussion to the economic-sociological debate on how corporations
in sensitive ‘‘concerned’’ markets (market exchange associated with negative
externalities of some sorts) may earn legitimacy (Geiger et al. 2015). At a time
when faith in market solutions to social problems is generally strong, and traditional
bureaucratic restrictions and coercive sanctions have been seen as outdated in many
contexts, we must be consistent in opening the black boxes of these market-based
legitimation processes to scrutinize the outcomes (Cowan and Rizzo 1995; Fourcade
and Healy 2007). In doing so, we must first acknowledge that organizing for
legitimacy in a formal bureaucracy is different from doing so in a contested market
setting (Alexius 2014). This is because, in markets, it is comparatively more
difficult than in a formal bureaucracy to tell who should be responsible for what and
why (ibid). Following from the fact that there is typically a lack of clear hierarchy
and membership in markets (i.e. less clear who belongs to a market or not), market
contexts are generally more open to organizing experiments in terms of how to
achieve, judge and justify legitimate behaviour (Brunsson et al. 2015). In this
article, we acknowledge that hybrid organizations face the challenge of standing
with one foot in each of these worlds and their different conditions for legitimacy.
The text is organized as follows: Sect. 2 provides the theoretical framework
based on neo-institutional theory and focuses on discussing the strategic response of
decoupling in light of the novel conditions for hybrids in the contemporary era of
market-embedded morality. The research methodology and data source is then set
out in Sect. 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results of the case study and Sect. 5
offers a discussion of the findings and concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Neo-institutional theory on decoupling
The focus of much organization theory has been on the conditions and processes
that facilitate the implementation and institutionalization of new ideas or structures
in organizational practice. According to the still-prevailing rational ideal, for
maximum legitimacy, each idea or structure formally decided upon in the
organization hierarchy should optimally permeate the organization, from its
management to its production processes, products and services. However, for the
past four decades, ever since Meyer and Rowan wrote their seminal article on
formal structure as ‘‘myth and ceremony’’ (Meyer and Rowan 1977), social science
scholars have become increasingly open to and interested in demonstrating how
strategic responses may vary from passive conformity to active resistance to
institutional pressures, depending on the nature and context of the pressures
themselves (Oliver 1991).
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In particular, critical organization studies in the neo-institutional tradition
(Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Czarniawska and Se´von 1996) have shown that, in
practice, it is often difficult to implement objectives, values and structures that are
perceived to clash in some way with an organization’s core values and operations.
One way of solving this dilemma is to organize a separation of legitimizing formal
structures from core operations. The strategic response of decoupling refers to
instances in which organizations under pressure to adopt particular structures or
procedures may opt to respond in a ceremonial manner, making changes in their
formal structures to signal conformity, but then buffering internal units, allowing
them to operate independent of these pressures (compare Scott 2014, p. 189). In
light of Oliver’s (1991) categorization of strategic responses, decoupling is seen as a
strategy of compromise and as an attempt at balancing to ‘‘obtain an accept-
able compromise on competing objectives and expectations’’ (Oliver 1991, p. 153).
According to Battilana and Lee (2014) compromise could be achieved by
separation. The authors discuss compartmentalization as one such separation
strategy, and in this article we propose that decoupling is another vital separation
strategy aimed to achieve a compromise between ‘‘multiple stakeholders and
interests’’ (Oliver 1991, p. 153).
Decoupling is a common response to conflicting goals and expectations in all
organizations (Greenwood et al. 2011) although the strategy is particularly relevant
for hybrid organizations who, by their very constitution are heavily exposed to
tensions and dilemmas generated by competing rationalities, values and logics (such
as bureaucratic vs. market, public vs. private services; global vs. local). Decoupling
is typically seen in cases in which a policy prescribed by external actors conflicts
with internal institutionalized practices promoted by actors in the organization
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996; MacLean and Behnam 2010). Solving this tension is
critical for organizations that aim to acquire, maintain or restore legitimacy, not
least towards government agencies, the state and lawmakers (Suchman 2005). A
common response in such situations is thus to symbolically adopt the external policy
while actually implementing the practice that is more coherent with internal
organizational routines (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Oliver 1991; Fiss and Zajac
2004, 2006; Buck and Shahrim 2005; Yoshikawa et al. 2007; Pache and Santos
2013).
Empirical evidence of decoupling being used to gain or maintain legitimacy can
be found in a variety of organizational contexts. Organizations have been shown to
decouple especially during transitional periods when facing conflicting require-
ments related to different policies, including environmental, quality and auditing
issues. In addition, organizations may find it difficult to persist with decoupling
strategies for a long time. Moreover, decoupling may be difficult to sustain in
contexts where institutional logics conflict in a temporary way. Decoupling is thus
extremely relevant for hybrid organizations that are exposed to long-term
institutional complexity requiring them to coexist with competing institutional
logics over time (Pache and Santos 2013; Battilana and Dorado 2010; Denis et al.
2015). What we contribute to explore in this article is whether decoupling may be
performed, not only on the micro-level of the organization but also on the meso-
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level of the market, and if so what characterizes and distinguishes these two forms
of decoupling. This argument is outlined in more detail below.
2.2 Decoupling in the age of market-embedded morality?
The perceived relationship of economy and morality changes over time and space
and has remained contested (Zelizer 1979, 1985, 2005). In recent decades of neo-
liberal regimes of government, public domains have been increasingly economized
and we have seen non-financial value creation becoming increasingly overtrumped
by, or expressed in terms of financial values in processes of commensuration
(Espeland and Stevens 1998; Alexius and Tamm Hallstro¨m 2014). As a sign of the
continuous balancing act of social life and its heterogeneity of values, the tendency
to economize the social seems to have dialectically given rise to attempts to
accentuate social values furthered by the economy. Emerging discursive formations,
along with novel practices, have brought about a movement aimed to ‘‘moralize’’
markets in general and business enterprises and consumers in particular (Shamir
2008). This movement towards ‘‘market-embedded morality’’ characterized by
attempts to ‘‘embed’’ morality into capitalist markets and the exchanges between
buyers and sellers have been both praised and criticized by social science scholars.
A common starting point for many business studies of the contemporary
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) movement is the assumption that self-
regulatory initiatives contribute to the expanding of business actors’ responsibility
and accountability. However, a common critique when scrutinizing these claims and
measures has been one of cherry-picking (Baden and Harwood 2012). Part of this
critical debate has concerned the institutionalized spirit of capitalism and the
willingness and capabilities of business enterprises to act socially responsible and to
be accountable for economic externalities. Critical scholars have emphasized the
influence of the ‘‘straitjacket of economic rationality’’ (Brooks 2010, p. 604) and
have referred to common taboos in CSR discourses and practices (Kallio 2007).
This stream of critical CSR-studies questions whether markets offer an effective
mechanism for the social control of business and encourages us to open the black
boxes of various CSR-measures and responsibility claims to scrutinize if perhaps,
they produce ‘‘responsibility gaps’’ rather than fulfill expectations of an expanded
responsibility and accountability for the social problem at hand (Alexius 2014).
Critical scholars (e g Miller and Rose 1990; Donzelot 1991; O’Malley 1996;
Miller and Rose 1997; Rose 1999) have pointed out that general shifts in the
distribution of responsibility—from the government to the private and civil
sectors—have occurred in a number of countries and policy areas including
pensions, welfare, and healthcare. These shifts have often drawn on discursive
formations that center on a prospective (future-oriented) principle of responsi-
bility distribution where the judgement and decision is based on an assessment
of the expected future behaviour and capabilities, rather than on a more
traditional retrospective judgement of past decisions and actions (Miller 2001;
Bexell 2005).
As an empirical illustration of this discursive shift in recent decades, gambling-
related harm is actively being constructed and reproduced in a hegemonic way that
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situates the main responsibility for the emergence and handling of gambling-related
harm on the individual gambler and that relies heavily on the individual’s capacity
to control and adjust his/her consumption to prevent it (Alexius 2017). On a wider
scale, numerous socio-moral questions—traditionally the concern of civic organi-
zations, liberal-democratic parliaments, trade unions, and political parties—have
increasingly become the business of market actors who offer responsibility-labelled
products and services at the heart of the phenomenon of market-embedded morality
(Shamir 2008). However, a key issue for critique has concerned the extent of
consumer empowerment. Is it right to assume that consumer sovereignty is possible
and if so, does it ensure social responsibility in business via the market mechanism?
(Smith 1990/2015). Summing up, the shift towards market-embedded morality
(morality embedded in market actors and their exchange of, in particular,
responsibility-labelled products and services) is interesting as it is a subtle yet
potentially powerful governance technique for shifting responsibility for societal
shortcoming and the downsides of economic exchange onto individuals. This is
done in a prospective manner that emphasizes consumer capabilities to make
informed choices to self-manage and self-regulate social risks (Rose 1999).
In today’s popular responsibility discourse one notes a hopeful ‘‘win–win’’ ideal
that invites attempts, by companies in particular, to realize and balance conflicting
values and to strive to fulfil both profit objectives and responsibility objectives
(Garsten and So¨rbom 2014; Nyqvist and Thedvall 2014). Although institutional
theory has long acknowledged the strategic response of decoupling in organizational
contexts (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Oliver 1991), the potential of exploring and
refining how this concept may be used to analyse strategic responses in the era of
market-based morality has yet to be explored. There are good reasons to do so as the
age of market-embedded morality offers a different set of options and challenges for
legitimately responding to institutional demands.
Previous studies on decoupling have traditionally focused on decoupling within a
formal organization (organisation-based decoupling), typically decoupling from
core operations to a specialized department designated for a certain institutional
demand. When an organization faces conflicting institutional demands, it is
common for the organization’s management to invest resources in creating or
strengthening a particular responsibility department, where activities are pursued
under the popular labels of ‘‘CSR’’ and ‘‘sustainability’’ and are aimed at promoting
and communicating that the organization is taking a greater responsibility. The
typical rhetoric is then that the CSR department will serve as the engine for that
organization’s responsibility work, the force that ensures that responsibility is not
only communicated externally but that it also permeates the organization’s internal
areas in their entirety. But in practice, this ambition often stops at just that—an
honourable ambition. Instead of responsibility permeating the entire organization
and being seen as an obvious precondition for generating profit, the responsibility
work can be isolated to the CSR department, where it manifests as rationalized
myths and ceremonies (Meyer and Rowan 1977) that are retold and celebrated in the
organization’s separate ‘‘display cases’’—for example, in its CSR or sustainability
reports.
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Many organizations also attempt to respond to conflicting institutional demands
and value conflicts by taking a preventive, informative stance with respect to
responsibility (Meyer 1996) and by decoupling such claims internally (Meyer and
Rowan 1977), for example by strategically delimiting the permeating ambition to a
part of the core business, a separate ‘‘niche range’’ of products and services labelled
more responsible or sustainable. These goods are then developed as an alternative or
complement to the organization’s regular product range. Another related, more
radical, but not uncommon variation on the above niche range theme is seen when an
organization’s stakeholders are offered options for responsible exchanges without the
organization itself modifying its core products and services in any way. This can be a
matter of offering responsible ‘‘accessories’’ for its risky or otherwise controversial
products. For example, it can be a question of protective clothing for motor cyclists.
This organizing solution, which has received less attention in the literature, implies
that corporations have the option of decoupling their responsibility work from the core
business in their contestedmarket—by referring to or themselves helping to organize a
‘‘side-market’’ for responsibility services and responsibility products that can be seen
as a kind of decoupled solution to the legitimacy problems and lack of responsibility of
the primary market (Jutterstro¨m et al. 2014). Themarket for trading emissions permits
is an example of such externally decoupled responsibility, created to address critique
in primary markets like the markets for coal, electricity and metal products (ibid).
Instead of banning an industry or practice or forcing an organization to take more
responsibility, this is a question of attempts to address the primary market’s
responsibility problems through supply and demand—by packaging and offering
responsibility on a voluntary basis: ‘‘Responsibility for Sale!’’ By ascribing an
economic value to the non-economic value ‘‘responsibility’’, responsibility can thus be
commodified—made into a product that can be marketed and offered in the market
(Zelizer 1979, 1985, 2005; Shamir 2008). To conclude this section, both organization-
based and market-based decoupling are strategic responses that may help organiza-
tions with complex value-laden missions—such as hybrid organizations—to be
perceived as legitimate actors. However, the usefulness of this conceptual distinction
is yet to be explored. The next section on methodology outlines our thoughts on how
this endeavour could best be realized.
3 Research context and method
Case studies are generally a well suited methodology to capture the dynamics of
organizational life (Eisenhardt 1989) and tend to be most valuable when the
researchers are clear about their initial theoretical position and at the same time
remain open for theoretical modifications, based on tentative rounds of case analysis
(Otley and Berry 1994). In explanatory case studies, theory is useful insofar as it
enables the researcher to provide convincing explanations to the case practices. If
however available theories do not provide adequate explanations, it will be
necessary to modify such theory or develop new theory (Scapens 2004).
The case study on the Swedish fully state-owned enterprise Svenska Spel
presented in this paper draws on and was conducted as part of extensive
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ethnographic and longitudinal fieldwork on the organizing of responsibility in
markets. The Swedish gambling market during the period 1990–2015 was studied
and particular focus was placed on following the establishment and handling of the
phenomenon of ‘‘gambling addiction’’ as an externality problem of essence to the
legitimacy of the market. The overarching aim was to provide a rich empirical
account of the most influential events, organizers, ideas, exchanges, norms, rules
and representations that, starting at the end of 1980s, contributed to changing the
general understanding of the externality problems in focus, the distribution of
responsibility and the forms of responsibility organizing. Who and what influenced
the organizing of responsibility? Who or which parties were made responsible? For
what, on what grounds and by what means? During the fieldwork, ‘‘gambling
addiction’’ was not treated as a self-evident problem, naturally contingent on
gambling-market practices. Rather, the ambition was to analyse how it is that this
externality has come to be represented and perceived in this way (Beronius 1991;
Bacchi 2009).
Although the case study of Svenska Spel was commenced with the purpose to
explain how a hybrid organization deals with its dual mission, the ethnographical
and longitudinal field work inspired us to refine the existing theory on strategic
responses to institutional demands. In particular, tentative findings prompted us to
suggest a conceptual refinement of the central concept of decoupling (Meyer and
Rowan 1977). Analyzing the data in light of the literature on market-embedded
morality then further enabled us to see the more general potential of such a
conceptual refinement.
The case study used ethnography as a research methodology constituted by
multiple data collection methods—participant observations, interviews, and archival
sources. As a research method, ethnography is well suited to the understanding of
the dynamics and the processes of change, as it allows a researcher to engage with
organizations and the broader field in a way that enables a more comprehensive
understanding of, for example, how change unfolds over time and how practices
relate to intended reforms (Adams and Larrinaga-Gonzalez 2007).
The empirical material collected and analysed during the entire fieldwork in the
Swedish gambling market included document studies, 40 verbatim transcriptions of
interviews conducted in 2007–2010 with key informants in and around the market
(including representatives of gambling operators, NGOs, public authorities, care
providers, gamblers and journalists), and added to these, dozens of more informal
conversations. The size, full state ownership, and hence status as hybrid
organization of significant influence in the contested Swedish gambling market,
motivated a special focus on Svenska Spel’s institutional responses and claims to
morality via its responsibility work. Of the 40 face-to-face semi-structured
interviews, 18 were conducted with Svenska Spel employees and board members.
To enable further nuances and triangulation, 15 participant observations of
responsibility work in and around the market were conducted in 2008–2009 and
in 2013 at gambling operators, their agents in shops, restaurants, bingo halls and
casinos, at treatment facilities in primary care and private institutional care, and at
the national support association for gambling addiction. Five of these participant
observations were conducted at Svenska Spel. As for documents, these comprised
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thousands of pages of bylaws, policies, government appropriations, newspaper
articles, annual reports and other external reports, including CSR and responsibility
reports from the gambling operators studied, covering the years 1998–2012
(including documents from Svenska Spel and its predecessor Tipstja¨nst, the
Swedish Gambling Authority, the National Institute for Public Health and the
national support association for gambling addiction, SBRF).
The interviews were all taped, transcribed, coded and recoded to ensure that all
instances of the interview text relevant to the topic guide were retrievable. Field notes
were taken during participant observations and comparative analysis (mainly
qualitative, partly quantitative) was then carried out on emergent themes, which
were used as input in subsequent studies. Letting time pass between rounds of analysis
provided time for reflection, enabling the discovery of new meaningful patterns
(Davies and Harre´ 2001). All interviews were conducted in Swedish, and relevant
sections were translated by a professional translator. All in all, the fieldwork provided
a rare opportunity to follow over time how central organizations in a contestedmarket,
with the fully state-owned gambling company Svenska Spel in a pivotal role, have
responded to the criticism of lacking responsibility for the downside of the market,
with an emphasis on fraud and health issues (Alexius 2014).
4 Svenska Spel and the dual mission of responsible gambling
4.1 Historical background
The exchange of gambling products has always been a sensitive, value-laden policy area
(Reith 1999; de Goede 2005; Ihrfors 2007; Hong and Kacpercyk 2009; Husz 2004).
Looking specifically at the Swedish context, Alexius et al. (2014) identified three
transformative moments in the market between 1830 and the present—‘‘immoral
gambling’’ (approx. 1830–1844), ‘‘remoralization of gambling’’ (approx. 1920–1940)
and ‘‘emerging health concerns’’ (approx. 1995–ongoing). In the third transformative
moment, social health concerns were increasingly framed as connected to the exchange
of gambling products (Helling 2003; Ortiz 2006). Three events contributed to putting the
problemof ‘‘gambling addiction’’ onto the political agenda: Sweden becoming amember
of the EU in 1995, the publication of the first Swedish prevalence study on gambling
addiction in 1999 and the Internet boom that followed shortly thereafter (Alexius 2014).
Time after time from 1994 onwards, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had
ruled that a gambling monopoly like the one in Sweden could be justified only if its
purpose was one of protection (Schindler 1994; La¨a¨ra¨ 1999; Zenatti 1999; Gambelli
2003), more specifically, the effort to limit the exploitation of people’s desire to
gamble and to reduce the risk of crime and fraud. The historically central purpose of
state gambling activities—bringing money into the state coffers—could from this
time forward only be a positive ‘‘ancillary consequence’’ and not the sole purpose
(SOU 2000:50, 2006:11, 2008:124).
The net gaming revenues in Sweden were constantly growing from 12 billion
SEK in 1995 to more than 16 billion in 2015 (Table 1), and in the same year (2015)
Svenska Spel with Casino Monopol reached almost 50% of the regulated market.
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Further shaping this transformative moment, in 1999 the first Swedish prevalence
study on gambling habits and addiction estimated that at least 100,000 people in the
country (of a total of around nine million) had experienced direct negative
economic, social, personal and health consequences caused by their gambling.
About the same time the ongoing expansion of online gambling became a
worrisome threat to government monopolies around the world. Despite the rulings
of the ECJ and the findings of the prevalence report, the Swedish Parliament
subsequently chose to launch new gambling products. First the decision was taken
to reintroduce the Video Lottery Terminal (VLT) gambling machines that had been
banned in the 1970s. It was then decided to establish four international casinos in
the country. The licences for these new products were given to Tipstja¨nst, the larger
of the two state-owned gambling companies. In the decades to come, as described in
the case below, the state-owned gambling operator Svenska Spel (‘‘Swedish
Games’’—the result of a merger between the two SOEs Tipstja¨nst and Penninglot-
teriet in 1997) took active part in successful attempts to reframe the contestation of
gambling by increasingly emphasizing the role of ‘‘responsible gambling’’ as a
customer-centred approach to handling the criticism (Alexius 2014).
Table 1 Net gaming revenues in Sweden, mSEK. Source: Lotteriinspectionen Statistics (2017)
Regulated market Svenska Spel, excluding
Casino Cosmopol
Casino Cosmopol
(Svenska Spel)
1995 12,015 5904
1996 11,890 5675
1997 12,254 5878
1998 12,824 6396
1999 13,144 6412
2000 13,914 7281
2001 15,063 8453 33
2002 14,347 7682 304
2003 14,721 7880 720
2004 14,638 7909 853
2005 14,079 7600 922
2006 14,603 7904 1002
2007 15,704 8396 1153
2008 15,956 8532 1224
2009 16,673 8677 1198
2010 16,947 8433 1190
2011 17,267 8484 1203
2012 17,288 8629 1186
2013 17,248 8562 1167
2014 16,446 7782 1159
2015 16,717 7781 1180
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4.2 Svenska Spel: hybrid organization with a dual mission
The critical discussion regarding the state monopoly’s responsibility for the
downside of gambling had already begun during his predecessor’s years, but in the
autumn of 2004 it fell upon Jesper Ka¨rrbrink, Svenska Spel’s new CEO, to take
market shares in the less regulated and rapidly growing Internet-based market place,
and preferably at no social cost. The double-edged mission from the owner, the
Swedish government, was for Svenska Spel to sell entertaining games, preferably
with increased revenues. But this was to occur while maintaining a strict balance
between responsibility and profitability.
Svenska Spel’s mission is to offer responsible, safe and entertaining games to
the Swedish population […] We find it evident that commercial thinking and
responsible behaviour in society go hand in hand. (Excerpt from Svenska Spel
CSR Report 2004)
In its corporate governance, the Swedish government emphasized how Svenska
Spel, being an SOE, had a special capacity to manage a complexity of values and
hence better chances than the ordinary, private limited firms to successfully fulfil the
dual mission of selling appealing lotteries and games without risking additional
social costs. How this responsibility was to be organized in practice, however, was
nonetheless far from given (Forsstro¨m 2010; Stymne 2010)—and as the reader of
this case will soon notice, in the years to come, Svenska Spel would use both
organization-based and market-based decoupling to respond to their dual mission.
4.3 Responsibility that permeates!
According to the Svenska Spel board’s interpretation of the increased Internet
competition in the early 2000s, the ‘‘grow to maintain’’ strategy called for a
continued strong marketing push (Gustafzon, interview). According to this strategy,
the company should focus on attracting and keeping customers with a low to
medium risk profile, called ‘‘green players’’—players who (still) saw gambling as
entertainment. See, for example, this excerpt from the Annual report of 2007:
Svenska Spel’s gambling responsibility relates to providing players with
information, knowledge and specific tools to take control over their gambling.
In other words to not go from green to yellow or red.
From the outset, the stated objective was for Svenska Spel to become ‘‘world-class’’
in ‘‘responsible gambling’’. By way of effective ‘‘responsible gambling’’ initiatives,
Svenska Spel would serve as a ‘‘responsible social actor’’ and preferably distinguish
itself in a positive manner from other gambling companies, both the nationally
regulated and those operating in the global e-market. In the company’s 2004 CSR
report, under a heading entitled ‘‘Balance between profitability and responsibility’’,
Ka¨rrbrink officially explained his view of the complex mission:
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Our fundamental values demand that we strike a balance between profit and
responsible gambling. Maximization of profits is not an end in itself and
should not be sought at the cost of offering products that make it difficult for
people to control their gambling. […] Responsible gambling should permeate
all of our activities, from product development to marketing. We are at the
forefront of developing responsible gambling and our long-term ambition is to
be looked upon as a world leader in the field.
In this official statement, a rational perspective on decision-making and its influence
on an organization is communicated, as Svenska Spel emphasizes that the dual
mission should permeate the entire organization, including the core operations.
Following this outspoken rational ambition, in 2004, marketing costs for billboards
and TV advertising were reduced by 20%, and Svenska Spel gave up revenues when
about 200 VLT (Video Lottery Terminal) machines were relocated from ‘‘unsuit-
able’’ restaurant locations where gambling had become much too dominant,
according to the public authorities. Other examples of concrete measures of a
restrictive nature that influenced core operations included betting limits, the option
of voluntarily blocking oneself from games, an account-blocking option, and
restrictions on operating hours. ‘‘Sensitive games’’ were given age restrictions,
random test purchases were conducted, and the company worked to prevent credit
play and to promote ‘‘healthy gambling environments’’.
Svenska Spel’s management also responded to the institutional demands by
setting up a separate CSR-team to coordinate the responsible gambling issues. The
new team reported directly to the CEO. The outspoken ambition was for the
responsibility work to be so integrated in the organization that it would truly
permeate it and become an obvious part of everyone’s work (Forsstro¨m, interview).
The CSR staff started off by inviting the management teams of the different
business areas to workshops where they were asked to formulate a vision and to
come up with a number of concrete objectives and key performance indicators.
However, despite these goal-focused efforts, it soon proved difficult to find sponsors
for the responsibility work in the organization. For CSR manager Petra Forsstro¨m,
the internal responsibility integration became taxing as it became clear to her that
many employees felt that the responsibility work lacked clarity and was often
experienced as negative or unimportant. She recounts in an interview how people
would even try to ‘‘duck out of sight’’ when they saw her coming (Forsstro¨m,
interview).
Svenska Spel also responded to institutional demands by taking a more active
role in the at-times stormy policy debate. In newspaper articles, commentaries and
in the public conversation, Svenska Spel employees did their utmost to explain the
company’s mission and responsibility position. The communication included key
phrases like ‘‘increased knowledge’’ and ‘‘greater awareness’’. Many meetings were
held with stakeholders at home and abroad, above all with the other legal operators
in the Swedish gambling market, gambling addiction support groups, the Institute
for Public Health, the Swedish Gambling Authority, gambling researchers, social
services, care institutions and other stakeholders, as well as internationally at the
World Lottery Association (WLA) and European Lotteries (EL) (Svenska Spel
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Annual reports 2005–2010; Forsstro¨m 2010). Despite these many meetings, it was
still seen as relatively open to interpretation what responsibility the fully state-
owned gambling firm actually had to protect the players and how this responsibility
should be organized in practice (Forsstro¨m, interview; Forsstro¨m 2010).
4.4 Responsibility before profits? First signs of organizational decoupling
That responsibility issues had a special place in CEO Ka¨rrbrink’s heart was an
often-repeated sentiment. Anyone listening carefully could however soon hear him
describe the ‘‘responsibility before profit’’ strategy as the company’s most
commercial strategy and there was increased emphasis on the Svenska Spel brand,
(rather than its financial and non-financial results):
The Svenska Spel brand should convey a sense of security […] We have a
long-term ambition of distinguishing ourselves from other gambling compa-
nies in the Swedish market by being seen as a world leader in responsible
gambling (Svenska Spel i samha¨llet, CSR-report 2004, p. 4, 6).
Social responsibility is a natural part of our culture and an increasingly
important competitive advantage. […] we are working hard to make our focus
on responsible gambling an even more prominent part of the Svenska Spel
brand (Svenska Spel Annual report 2005, p. 14–15).
In a matter of a few years, the CSR team merged with the rapidly growing
communications department at Svenska Spel. The internal workshops and initial
ambitions of a permeating responsibility with a high degree of involvement and
ownership in core operations, were less emphasized as external communications and
branding became core priorities.
4.5 Market-based decoupling: responsibility as innovation of self-help tools
In the beginning of 2006, following a poker boom, approximately 180,000 Swedes
were playing on foreign-based online gambling sites and the question arose how
Svenska Spel should respond, considering rapidly increasing global Internet
competition. When Svenska Spel eventually received approval from the government
and launched its own online poker games in March 2006, it was a product with a
competitive rake and an innovative ‘‘built-in’’ self-regulating responsible gambling
tool. No poker game could start until a player had filled in the required information
about his/her gambling budget: how much money the player was prepared to lose
per day, week and month, and how much time—per day, week and month—the
player was prepared to spend playing. Once the gambling budget had been set, it
was not possible to raise the limit or increase the number of playing hours until the
current period registered in the system had lapsed. Requests to reduce one’s budget
or number of playing hours, on the other hand, went through immediately.
Additional responsible gambling tools, such as collective breaks, were also built
into the gambling product. When commodifying responsibility in this fashion,
Svenska Spel took a first step into the modern arena of market-embedded morality
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where different measures to tackle sensitive market externalities (such as gambling-
related harm) are expressed as products and services on sale in the moral economy.
Between March and December 2006, approximately 137,000 customers played
on the Svenska Spel poker site, and by December its national market share had
climbed to about 30%. When Svenska Spel’s online gambling was growing faster
than its competitors’, despite its higher price and lower payouts, Svenska Spel
interpreted this as a sign of a potential demand for ‘‘responsibility-labelled’’
gambling product and as a confirmation that market-based responses of this kind
were well-received.
In September 2006, there was a change of governments in Sweden, whereby a
conservative alliance took over from the former social democratic government. The
reins of finance minister were then turned over to the more gambling-sceptical,
conservative Anders Borg. Things had been different under previous Minister of
Finance Bosse Ringholm’s years. Compared to Borg, Ringholm came across as a
gambling enthusiast. Of likely significance in this context is also that Ringholm and
Svenska Spel’s board chairman, Anders Gustafzon, were old friends from their days
in the Swedish Social Democratic Youth League. Ringholm had thus acted as a
personal link to the Ministry of Finance and the government. Borg, on the other
hand, took a more wait-and-see approach and let Svenska Spel wait over a year
before an owner dialogue took place. This delay led to frustration in the gambling
company’s management, which was trying to plan for an uncertain future. For
despite the special efforts, Svenska Spel’s online poker had attracted political
criticism from abroad. The EU Commission deemed the poker venture a failure to
meet treaty obligations in accordance with EC law—a criticism that could not be
taken lightly. Pending an owner dialogue, Svenska Spel, however, continued full
steam ahead. The company applied for permit after permit and had ambitious long-
term business plans for exporting games abroad, if the government owner would
only allow its fully state-owned enterprise to do so.
4.6 Spelalagom.se: separate website for responsible gambling tools
While waiting for an owner dialogue and the findings of the online poker
commission, the Svenska Spel management found reason to take additional
responsibility measures (Gustafzon interview; Palmgren interview; Ka¨rrbrink
interviews). The company launched its ‘‘Play in moderation!’’ (Spela lagom!)
slogan and a separate website with the same name—spelalagom.se—offering an
entire portfolio of responsible gambling services referred to as ‘‘tools’’, all of which
were in line with keywords like ‘‘voluntary’’ and ‘‘individual responsibility’’. Along
with the usual gambling products, the idea was that customers of the state gambling
company would be given access to a suite of free training and tools to ensure
‘‘moderate’’ (lagom), balanced and responsible gambling. As Maria Schubert, part
of the CSR team of the Svenska Spel communications department later expressed it
(Schubert, interview):
In order to prevent unhealthy gambling, we offer a series of tools that help our
customers make good decisions about their gambling.
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But, as opposed to the ‘‘responsibility-labelled’’ poker, which had been launched as
a ready-to-use niche product for responsible gambling, the responsibility tools
(including a gambling budget tool, self-test and the timer function) were now clearly
separated from the company’s core products and operations in the sense that they
were not built into the games themselves. Furthermore, these tools were now
presented on a different website, separate from the main site www.svenskaspel.se
where gambling sales took place. This is a clear example of how organization-based
decoupling (setting up a different website on responsibility to respond to external
pressure and letting this website be isolated from the ordinary website) may be
combined with market-based decoupling (producing preventive tools and infor-
mation on responsible gambling that are offered—in a market-like fashion—as
products and services targeting consumers). In short: the commoditized responsi-
bility was now being offered on a site separated from Svenska Spel’s usual sales of
games. The official justification for this decision was not to tempt problem-gamblers
in need of help to buy new games. But there was also a risk that consumers about to
develop an addictive behaviour would not find the tools and services in time. An
internal, anonymous critique, claimed this could be seen in light of the company
slogan ‘‘spela lagom—play in moderation’’ meaning gambling not too much, but not
too little either.’’
In the autumn of 2006, Svenska Spel intensified its efforts in ‘‘responsible
gambling services’’ even further. Starting in late summer, first steps were taken
towards what would eventually become the ‘‘Playscan’’ (Spelkoll) tool. The
background to this tool was the external criticism and a discussion about Svenska
Spel’s marketing. Up to this time, the company had worked proactively, through its
customer relations management for example, to find customers that played ‘‘too
little’’, to remind them that they could play a bit more. Encouraging increased play
in this way was seen, internally, as uncontroversial if the marketing targeted the
98% of all customers who, based on the 1999 prevalence study, could be described
as low risk, ‘‘green’’ players. But CEO Ka¨rrbrink’s ambition was now to go even
further and create a tool that could identify the remaining 2%, the ‘‘problem
gamblers’’. He envisioned a kind of ‘‘breathalyser’’ for gambling. Ka¨rrbrink became
interested in the possibility of identifying gamblers with a so-called reverse ‘‘churn
profile’’—i.e. customers who suddenly began to buy significantly more and more
often than previously. As these customers were likely on their way to becoming
problem gamblers, it would be a good thing, for both social and long-term economic
reasons, to try to warn these customers in time, before Svenska Spel ended up losing
a good customer and risking their social mission. As Ka¨rrbrink recalls having
described it to the board (Ka¨rrbrink, interview 1):
So I’m sitting here and have been playing normally, and then something
happens in my life that makes me play more and more. It may just be that
there are a lot of interesting games right then, like World Cup soccer, that I’m
a big fan of, or something… that I don’t have anything to do, I want to escape
a boring everyday life or something. And then ‘‘ping’’ [sound effect]—‘‘If you
keep playing in this manner…’’. Well, yes, I’ve actually played a bit much…
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maybe I should make a budget. Maybe I’ll stop playing poker, take a three-
month break.
In close collaboration with advanced mathematicians and gambling psychologists,
Svenska Spel initiated a project tasked with coming up with a model that could get
players to remain in the ‘‘healthy, green gambling zone’’, as they expressed it
(Cederberg, interview). At the bottom of this construction lay a cognitive
behavioural theory-inspired self-test. Based on a player’s current gambling
attributes, it was able to predict what his/her gambling behaviour would look like
over the next three months so as to warn the player while he/she was still rational
and receptive. Ka¨rrbrink envisioned a comprehensive system that could be offered
as an accessory to all types of games in the Svenska Spel group and hoped that this
would give Svenska Spel a competitive advantage pending any future regulation
changes in the gambling market (Ka¨rrbrink, interview 1). These were additional
steps taken to separate Svenska Spel’s core operations from its responses to the
down-sides of gambling-related harm.
4.7 Political criticism
However, the company continued to receive the cold shoulder from the government.
No owner dialogue and no new permits. A reason behind this frosty relation was the
EU Commission’s repeated accusation and questioning of how the Swedish state
was fulfilling its protective intent concerning the risk of gambling-related harm. The
Commission now threatened to bring Sweden before the ECJ if Finance Minister
Borg failed to demonstrate responsibility: a Svenska Spel that protected its
citizens—not a state-owned gambling company whose core purpose was to make
money. For as seen in Fig. 1, ever since the merger that created Svenska Spel, the
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Fig. 1 Svenska Spel dividends to the state 1997–2015, mSEK. Source: svenskaspel.se, regeringen.se
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state-owned gambling operator has provided a solid contribution to the state budget.
And although the numbers have fluctuated a little over the years, the Svenska Spel
slogan ‘‘responsibility before profits’’ is not easily seen in this figure.
On 20 June 2007, almost a full year after the stinging EU critique, yet another
public gambling investigation was launched and the message from Borg and
Minister of Public Health Maria Larsson was clear: Don’t rock the boat until the
pressure from Brussels eases! (SvD 2007-06-20). It was a final official warning.
Some nine months later, on the evening of Thursday, 3 April 2008, Ka¨rrbrink
received two earth-shattering calls. The first to contact him was board chairman
Gustafzon, who informed Ka¨rrbrink that Gustafzon would probably have to step
down from his position. Shortly thereafter came the second call, from the
communications director, who informed Ka¨rrbrink about a press conference on the
future of Svenska Spel to be held at the Ministry of Finance the following day—a
press conference to which they had not been invited. Ka¨rrbrink watched the press
conference broadcast live on a web channel. He heard the Minister of Finance say
that Svenska Spel was not performing its duties, that the company was not taking
enough responsibility, and that the government would therefore change chairmen
and strengthen the focus on social responsibility and public health. When the
Minister of Finance criticized the responsibility work that Ka¨rrbrink felt he had
invested heart and soul in over the previous four years, he decided to resign
(Ka¨rrbrink, interviews; Gustafzon, interview). In a media interview, Ka¨rrbrink
communicated and explained his decision (SvD 2008-04-21):
We’ve chosen to invest a great deal in social responsibility and do more than
all other gambling companies in the world do. At the same time, we’ve
focused on maintaining our market shares and this is something we believed in
and I still believe in. We have a close eye on the balance and if it’s now going
to be moved in one direction or the other, I believe that will mean we’ll lose
our position and the players will move on.
Both Gustafzon and Ka¨rrbrink resigned and were heavily criticized in the Swedish
media. For example, the Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet wrote in an analysis
entitled ‘‘High Stakes’’ (SvD 2008-04-22) that:
Jesper Ka¨rrbrink’s journey to the exit this last year has been like that of a
kamikaze squeezing his eyes shut and deliberately throttling full-speed ahead
toward destruction – with dollar signs on the inside of his eyelids.
4.8 An unexpected twist: expert praise
But then came an unexpected twist. A few months later, Svenska Spel was, quite
paradoxically, named ‘‘the world’s most responsible gambling company’’ based on
the market-based responsible gambling development that had occurred under
Ka¨rrbrink’s and Gustafzon’s management. It was at the World Lottery Association
congress in Rhodes in October 2008 that a jury comprising CSR experts from
various sectors voted to give the company the ‘‘WLA Award for Responsible
Gambling Excellence’’, with the motivation that Svenska Spel ‘‘overall shows first
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class behaviour in the area of responsible gambling.’’ Svenska Spel also won first
prize in the category of best training programme for gambling agents. This expert
praise is a nice illustration of the complicated corporate governance matrix a state-
owned enterprise like Svenska Spel has to handle. Stake-holders on the national and
international arena use different and at times competing government and
governance measures to evaluate how the SOE has fulfilled its dual mission. Is
increasing profits necessarily a bad thing? What is the view on the commoditization
of responsibility, as seen in the market-based decoupling of separate sites, products
and services aimed to help consumers self-regulate the externality of the market?
The proof is in the pudding, and despite the prestigious industry award, it was
clear that all stake-holders were not equally pleased. A couple of months later, in
December 2008 when the public investigation into the future of gambling
regulations (SOU 2008:124) was presented, investigators once more saw fit to
point out that protection against the social harms of gambling addiction, fraud and
criminality should permeate everything from licensing, selling and the launch of
new games, to marketing and control (SOU 2008:124 pp. 573, 580). The
investigators stressed in particular that ‘‘The SOE must shoulder a greater and
more obvious responsibility.’’ Or in other words: responsibility should not be
decoupled and offered in a separate niche-market for responsible gambling tools, it
should permeate the entire organization.
4.9 A fresh attempt at market-based decoupling: setting up a separate
subsidiary
Ever since the very first responsibility policy in 2004, Svenska Spel had had plans to
sell its expertise in responsible gambling technology internationally. From the start,
the goal had been to export both games and technical solutions to other state
monopolies abroad (Palmgren, interview; Annual reports 2004–2005). At the end of
2004, the Svenska Spel board took a strategic decision to form the ‘‘Svenska Spel
International’’ business area. According to board chairman Anders Gustafzon,
Svenska Spel held discussions early onwith eight countries including theBaltic States,
Canada and Austria. The idea was to sell the technology under licence. In the 2006
Annual report (p. 15), for example, the following was written about this ambition:
Svenska Spel’s business attracts much international attention, and the poker
initiative with our unique responsible gambling solution is of interest to the
gambling world. We have commenced a partnership with Lithuania’s regulated
gambling company Olifeja, which will enable Lithuanian citizens to play games
such as Triss and Pick’n’Click in 2007. The beneficiary for the operations is the
Lithuanian Olympic Committee. We have also had a number of enquiries about
providing our responsible poker under licence to gambling companies in other
countries, something which would require permission from the government.
But that permission never came. Rather, the company’s international ambitions
were criticized, despite the increasing global Internet competition Svenska Spel
came to face. It became untenable from a policy standpoint for the government to
justify the claim that the purpose of Svenska Spel was to protect Swedish gambling
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in Sweden, and that the ability of others to sell games in the country should
therefore be limited, if at the same time Svenska Spel itself would establish itself
abroad. Due to the paradoxical EU position taken in the mid-1990s and defended
ever since, the price European state-owned gambling companies had to pay for the
protection of their monopoly status was an outspoken national limit to their sales.
In March 2010, following the change of board chairs, two CEO replacements and
a steady decrease in both profits and market share, Svenska Spel was allowed to
challenge the paradoxical EU position or at least to enter its ‘‘grey zone’’ when
forming a separate subsidiary, Playscan Limited. This subsidiary was assigned to
manage international sales, not of games, but of the PlayscanTM responsible
gambling technology, for the expressed purpose of combating gambling problems in
the global gambling industry (Olsson, interview; Svenska Spel Annual report 2010).
The new company’s motto was ‘‘healthy gambling is good business’’. Playscan’s
first CEO and former part of the CSR team at Svenska Spel, Ann-Sofie Olsson,
commented on the efforts invested in spreading the company’s responsible
gambling tools to regulated gambling companies in Sweden and abroad as follows
(Svenska Spel Annual report 2010, 16):
The PlayscanTM responsible gambling tool creates the potential to contribute
to the development of long-term sustainability across the international
gambling market. We’re simply combining a commercial approach with
social responsibility.
According to Svenska Spel, the Playscan tool soon stirred ‘‘major international
interest’’ (ibid, 16) and, in its 2011 Annual report, Svenska Spel announced that
Playscan Limited had now reached agreements with two domestic lotteries
A-lotterierna and Miljonlotteriet, as well as three foreign: the French La Franc¸aise
de Jeux, the Finnish RAY, and the Canadian Atlantic Lottery. And these first
contracts were soon followed by contracts with Swedish Kombispel and Norwegian
Norsk Tipping (www.playscan.com/pages/case, accessed 2013-08-11). In 2013, the
company changed CEOs and sales increased at the same time as it launched an
upgrade, Playscan 3.7, with improved analytical capabilities for their operators.
Playscan also hired renowned gambling researcher Dr Richard Wood, who com-
menced an evaluation of Playscan’s effectiveness as a consumer protection system
for the global internet gambling market (www.playscan.com, accessed 2013-08-11).
But only two years later, in July 2015, the sensitive venture came to an end as
Playscan announced in a press release that the company would merge into Svenska
Spel and that the product would no longer be commercially available to new cus-
tomers. Said Andreas Holmstro¨m, CEO of Playscan, in the press release:
Our solution has been ahead of this curve, leading the way, which is really
inspiring. However, we see that many operators pursue their own solutions,
making demand for an off-the-shelf solution low.
As seen in Table 2, Playscan was never a cash cow for Svenska Spel. It was never a
question of big money, nor big risks. In fact, although this was indeed a new
venture, the financial results indicate that setting up the company is likely to have
served a ceremonial purpose for Svenska Spel, rather than a commercial.
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All in all, the tricky balancing act of attempting to operate in a global market, yet
within a national jurisdiction, had taken its toll on the hybrid organization. At the
time of writing this case in the summer of 2016, Svenska Spel rests its case awaiting
the results of yet another public inquiry on the future of the Swedish gambling
market, with a possible introduction of a licence system that would allow foreign
gambling firms with a public licence to legally take their business across the
national border. Only time will tell what position a fully state-owned company with
a mission to act as a moral role model can successfully take and keep in such a
competitive setting. We will not be surprised if we find a renewed emphasis on
market-embedded morality, as in sales of ‘‘tools’’ in the global side-market of
‘‘responsible gambling’’.
5 Conclusion and discussion: decoupling in the age of market-
embedded morality
The findings presented in this article contribute to the theory of hybrid organizations
and to a more nuanced understanding of how they, over time, may respond to
institutional pressure and a complex dual mission by decoupling, not only within the
formal organization (Meyer and Rowan 1977) but also by way of market devices,
responsibility labelled products and exchanges in their contested market setting
(Shamir 2008; Alexius 2014). The study also contributes to the emerging literature
on the dilemma between state ownership and strategy of SOEs (Cuervo-Cazurra
et al. 2014). In terms of practical implications, the findings are highly relevant to
anyone involved in the corporate governance of an SOE: politicians, public servant
owner representatives, board members and managers, although the findings can also
be relevant to a wider range of stakeholders for both SOEs and other hybrid
organizations. In this final section, we elaborate on the overarching theme of how
and why hybrids in particular may respond to calls for responsibility in the age of
market-embedded morality.
As was discussed in some detail in the introduction to this paper, hybrid
organizations are expected to reach financial and non-financial goals and to satisfy
the needs of multiple stakeholders (i.e. costumers, the government, the general
public, etc.) (Thomasson 2009; Alexius and Cisneros O¨rnberg 2015). The tensions
over these different goals imposes a cognitive burden on boards and managers that
requires an acceptable compromise (Argento et al. 2016). In our contemporary
Western business climate there is much talk about realizing the ‘‘responsibility
capital’’ (Sjo¨stro¨m and Sweet 2010) of corporations, and a growing body of CSR
consultants and concerned internal leaders take part in driving the push to help
Table 2 Playscan AB financial results 2010–2014, kSEK
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Turnover 8549 8277 3836 7045 9071
Net income -1342 -5208 -8891 -7391 14
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organizations become permeated with responsibility (Windell 2006; Jutterstro¨m and
Norberg 2013; Alexius et al. 2017). This is because, to be perceived as legitimate in
the long run, market actors—and in particular corporations—must make and justify
claims to be actors with morality (Zelizer 1979; Fourcade and Healy 2007).
However, when taking a closer look at the actual practices of corporate
responsibility, particularly in organizations with complex missions, we find that it
is more common than not that the official ambition of a permeating responsibility is
translated and diluted.
In light of the case findings presented in this paper, like all hybrid organizations,
SOEs can harvest legitimacy-enhancing elements of potentially conflicting institu-
tional logics such as political and market logics. However, as the case on Svenska
Spel clearly demonstrates, this is a complicated balancing act that risks backfiring.
Around the year 2000, the ongoing expansion of online gambling became a
worrisome threat to government monopolies around the world. How would national
monopoly regulation (such as the Swedish Lotteries Act), be able to handle
globalization of the gambling market? As a nationally regulated, fully state-owned
firm in a rapidly digitalized, globalizing contested market with increasingly fierce
competition in the e-gambling segment, Svenska Spel found itself in the difficult
position of what could be called a ‘‘government/governance matrix of responsibility
organizing’’, characterized by multiple stakeholders with conflicting interests and
expectation and views on how Svenska Spel should aim to fulfill competing
objectives and expectations from the government and from the market (Oliver
1991). In the political sphere, national and EU politicians and public authorities
drew on traditional organizational elements such as membership and hierarchy
(EU), and rules (both national legislation and EC regulation), as well as formal
monitoring and sanctions (national public agencies, the ECJ and the commission).
In the market sphere on the other hand, claims to responsibility and corporate
morality were justified with reference to a multitude of standards, tools and NGO
awards. Despite a clearly outspoken ambition—in fact a raison d’eˆtre—to have
responsibility permeate the SOE, the complexity of the dual mission of ‘‘responsible
gambling’’ and its underlying conflicting values (of profit making and public health
achievements) quickly prompted Svenska Spel to start decoupling.
At first Svenska Spel used what we in this paper have called organization-based
decoupling (decoupling within a formal organization), following Meyer and Rowan
(1977). By adopting a special CSR policy, by setting up a CSR team and by
appointing a CSR manager, Svenska Spel was able to continue to apply for permits
for new games and to push profitability by way of a ‘‘green growth’’ ambition
(selling a little more to the many, rather than a lot to problem gamblers). At the
outset (in 2004–2005), Svenska Spel also introduced a number of responsibility
measures traditionally associated with the political sphere of government, such as
age limits and marketing restrictions.
However, when faced with the rapidly digitalized global competition, over the
next couple of years, Svenska Spel’s response changed its emphasis from
organization-based decoupling to what we have defined as marked-based decou-
pling, as seen in the gradual outward and downward shift of responsibility from the
organizational context of the firm to the consumers in the market context (Miller
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and Rose 1990; Rose 1999). In empirical practice, this meant that the organizing site
of ‘‘responsible gambling’’ in Svenska Spel shifted from the board room to the
communications department, via a niche range of responsibility-labelled games and
a separate site with specialized responsible gambling e-tools, out to a separate
subsidiary (Playscan Limited) targeting both national and international gambling
operators. The conceptual distinction between organization-based and market-based
decoupling is not only structural however. It is also a matter of shifting logics as
seen when Svenska Spel increasingly referred to a prospective logic for distributing
responsibility in the market, a logic according to which it could be legitimate for a
producer of games to take on a role as an educator and provider of advice and tools
for responsible gambling. Advice and tools that are created with the specific intent
of enabling consumers to take responsibility by changing their gambling habits. All
in all, this means that the behaviour on which the hybrid organization bases its
legitimacy changed as a market logic was employed.
We suggest that the temptation to make such claims to market-embedded
morality may be referred to not only as a suitable response to the global competition
and as a sign of conformation to modern ways of organizing gambling firms, but
also as a measure that conflicts less with the profit-making objective of the hybrid
organization. This is because selling responsible gaming devices and tools to other
gambling operators world-wide did not hinder Svenska Spel from continuing to sell
its risky games to consumers at home. Also, making these risk-reducing tools
available to operators did not mean consumers at risk were actually using them
(Alexius 2017). But nevertheless, market-embedded morality (embedded in tools
such as PlayscanTM in processes of commodification and responsibilization)
provided the operators with much needed legitimacy.
It is important to note that these findings from a Swedish SOE operating in the
gambling market may well be generalizable to many other hybrid organizations
positioned at the crossroads of political/government and market/governance
schemes of responsibility organizing. Although the aim of this article is not to
provide generalizability but rather to suggest conceptual refinement based on a rich
empirical case, we encourage scholars to explore the frequency and consequences of
hybrid organizations seeking legitimacy not only by organization-based decoupling
but also, and perhaps increasingly, by marked-based decoupling responses.
If this is indeed an expanding phenomenon, it also becomes crucial to analyse to
what extent we should trust that such emerging niche products and side markets
actually solve or handle the problems and value conflicts at stake. As suggested by
Fourcade and Healy (2007) and Shamir (2008), we must continue to scrutinize the
outcomes of these corporate claims to market-embedded morality.
Given today’s increasing mediatization and demands for transparency, not least
as concerns the responsibility work of SOEs, the need to defend the organization
against criticism can be devastating for its reputation if it comes to light that the
hybrid organization is, in effect, protecting its core business from responsibility
claims (Grafstro¨m et al. 2013). The ending of the Svenska Spel case offers a neat
illustration of how marked-based decoupling may not offer the same degree of
legitimacy with the stakeholders/general public as organization-based decoupling
does. In this case, it became untenable from a policy standpoint to claim that the
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purpose of Svenska Spel was to protect Swedish gamblers in Sweden, and that the
ability of others to sell games should therefore be limited, at the same time as
Svenska Spel itself was noting record national poker sales and had plans to establish
itself abroad. The EU Commission had on repeated occasions accused the Swedish
state of hypocrisy and threatened to bring Sweden before the ECJ if the Minister of
Finance failed to demonstrate that the Swedish state was demonstrating responsi-
bility, a Svenska Spel that protected its citizens—not a gambling company whose
sole purpose was to make money.
Considering these empirically based insights, we conclude with a call for future
studies of hybrid organizations and their decoupling attempts to scrutinize the
popular rhetoric of market-embedded morality as an ‘‘empowerment’’, ‘‘service’’,
etc. to customers. It may well be that this discourse and its responsibilization of
consumers contributes to protect the hybrid organization against hypocrisy which in
turn may make market-based decoupling an increasingly popular response.
Although the ethnographical method used in this paper does not lend itself well
to generalizations, we have little reason to believe that Svenska Spel is a ‘‘unique’’
case. In a future comparative study comprising a wider selection of hybrid
organization (for example SOEs), it would be worthwhile to consider exploring how
variations in factors such as market orientation and competition, the political
sensitivity of the product or service and the degree of perceived risks posed to
consumers affect the use and outcomes of the strategic response of market-based
decoupling.
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